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YOU CAN’T TRUST EVERYTHING ON THE
INTERNET: A LOOK INTO TEXAS’ AND
MARYLAND’S APPROACH OF SOCIAL
MEDIA AUTHENTICATION.
Danielle Orr

Evidence cannot speak for itself. Someone must testify about the evidence to
speak to its truthfulness, through a process called authentication.1 Each
jurisdiction has its own rules regarding how authentication works, but the reason
for such process is the same throughout. According to the Federal Rules of
Evidence, “[t]o satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item
of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding
that the item is what the proponent claims it is.”2 From this rule comes the most
famous phrase about authentication: to prove that the evidence is what it purports
to be.3 Authentication is required so that evidence can be accepted as true and
then determined to be relevant, which is the ability to prove a fact, disprove a
fact, or make a fact more probable.4


Juris Doctor Candidate, Columbus School of Law, 2022; The Catholic University Journal
of Law and Technology, Production Editor, 2021-2022; Bachelor of Arts in Political
Science, Florida Atlantic University, 2019. Thank you to my family and friends for all of
their support and guidance on this article and in life: Chip and Terri Orr, Monica Vila
Castro, Seamus Maloney, and Isaiah Moriarity.
FED. R. EVID. 901(a). But see id. 902 (stating some evidence does not require “extrinsic
evidence of authenticity in order to be admitted” as it is “self-authenticating”).
2
Id. 901(a).
3
Vincent DiCarlo, Summary of the Rules of Evidence, FINDLAW,
https://corporate.findlaw.com/litigation-disputes/summary-of-the-rules-of-evidence.html
(last updated Mar. 29, 2018).
4
FED. R. EVID. 401; Jerome Michael & Mortimer J. Adler, Real Proof, 5 VAND. L.
REV. 344, 362 (1952); Sublet v. State, 113 A.3d 695, 709 (Md. 2015); EDMUND M.
MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 38 (1963); see generally ROBERT P. MOSTELLER,
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185 (J. Dickson Phillips ed., 1952) (explaining relevancy and
how it is weighted for admissibility standards).
1
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Typically, a witness with personal knowledge of the evidence in question will
be called to the stand to answer questions regarding the evidence’s relevance
and genuineness.5 This process is easy to understand when the evidence is
physical—for example, in the case of a contract, a party to the contract may
testify to their first-hand knowledge of that contract in which he or she entered.
Thus, the contracting party is able to answer questions regarding the terms of the
contract, other signatories, and circumstances regarding the contract’s creation.6
Authentication of evidence on the internet, however, is different. Because the
evidence is not already physical, or originally written on paper, the proponent of
the evidence must make the proposed evidence physical by printing out a copy
of the social media post.7 However, the likelihood of an online post being
unauthentic is greater as well, adding to the problems posed when authenticating
social media evidence.
This article is not about evidence that is easily authenticated, such as a
contract; rather, it is a dive into authentication of social media evidence and
about the dangers of letting unreliable information into the record due to the
limited, or lack of, ability to show that such evidence is what it purports to be.
The purpose of this note is to illustrate that all United States jurisdiction must
realize the dangers in social media and interpret their evidentiary rules
accordingly. By comparing and contrasting Maryland’s and Texas’ differing
approaches to social media authentication, this article will demonstrate that
Texas’ permits unreliable evidence into the record, violating the defendant’s due
process rights. While demonstrating the low standard of Texas’, this note
recommends Texas courts apply the Maryland approach, with some changes, in
order to embrace the ever-growing dangers of the internet.
Section I of this article discusses social media and explains the dangers of
allowing social media evidence into court. With those social media dangers in
mind, section II explains and differentiates the Maryland and Texas approaches
in authenticating proffered social media evidence. Section III explains the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendment standard of Due Process and takes the position that,
although neither of the discussed approaches is perfect, the Texas approach is
particularly troublesome as it violates due process. Finally, section IV discusses
the changes needed to the Texas approach in order to comport with due process
and still allow for authentic evidence to enter into the record through the
infamous Manti Te’o catfishing situation.

5
Evidence, JRANK ARTICLES, https://law.jrank.org/pages/6615/EvidenceAuthentication-Identification.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2021).
6
See FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(1) (“Testimony that an item is what it is claimed to be.”).
7
Paul W. Grimm et al., Authentication of Social Media Evidence, 36 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVOC. 433, 444 (2013).
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I. THE POPULARITY AND RISK OF SOCIAL MEDIA EVIDENCE
Social media has increased in popularity over the last decade and had
numerous applications from blogs to content communities, to virtual worlds.8
Social media is defined as any form of electronic communication “which users
create online communities to share information, ideas, personal messages, and
other content.”9
As of July 2020, more than 3.96 billion people use social media, which is over
half of the world’s population.10 With the rise in popularity of social media, a
rise in hacking has followed suit.11 Most recently, in July of 2020, politicians
and high profile celebrities––such as President Joe Biden, Elon Musk, and
Kanye West––and companies––such as Apple and Uber–– were part of a bitcoin
scam in which hackers were able to get through Twitter’s security and post on
the parties’ respective accounts.12 While it is dangerous that our nation’s leaders
and high-profile characters have been hacked, these individuals have the means
to compile evidence to prove a hack occurred. But what about those who do not
have the means to hire experts to prove the evidence (i.e., the postings on their
accounts) is not what it purports to be due to a hack?13 As social media
authentication depends on the premise that the profile or posting was created by
its purported owner, a question should always arise regarding whether such
profile or posting is due to a hacker or other unauthorized user of the social
media account.14 How does one prove such unauthorized posting? Will it
always be a he-said-she-said situation?
A. Social Media is Sometimes What it Purports to Be
In 1999, before the surge of social media use, courts were already suspicious

Id. at 434.
Social Media, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/social%20media (last visited Nov. 12, 2021).
10 Simon Kemp, Digital 2020: July Global Statshot, DATAREPORTAL (July 21, 2020),
https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2020-july-global-statshot.
11 How Often Are Social Media Accounts Hacked?, ZEROFOX (Jan. 22, 2021),
https://www.zerofox.com/blog/often-social-media-accounts-hacked/ [hereinafter ZEROFOX].
12 Aaron Holmes, et al., Hackers Took Over Dozens of High-profile Twitter Accounts
Including Those of Barack Obama, Joe Biden, Elon Musk, Kim Kardashian, and Apple and
Used Them to Post Bitcoin Scam Links, BUS. INSIDER (July 15, 2020),
https://www.businessinsider.com.au/hackers-bitcoin-crypto-cashapp-gates-ripple-coindesktwitter-scam-links-2020-7?r=US&IR=T.
13 Matthew Menendez, et al., The Steep Costs of Criminal Justice Fees and Fines,
BRENNAN CENT. FOR JUST. (Nov. 21, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/ourwork/research-reports/steep-costs-criminal-justice-fees-and-fines.
14 Sublet v. State, 113 A.3d 695, 697 (Md. 2015) (consolidating three cases regarding
different social media authentication issues).
8
9
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of information found on the internet, famously stating “[a]nyone can put
anything on the Internet. No web-site is monitored for accuracy.”15 This same
quote is the basis of the decision in a 2002 case, Moroccanoil, Inc. v. Marc
Anthony Cosmetics, Inc., where the defendant proffered evidence of the
plaintiff’s Facebook page, attempting to show that Facebook users
interchangeably used the terms “Moroccanoil” and “Moroccan Oil” to refer to
both the defendant’s argan oil and plaintiff’s trademarked product.16 The United
States District Court for the Central District of California found that the evidence
was not properly authenticated, noting Marc Anthony Cosmetics could not
authenticate the posting since authentication focuses on truth, and the truth of
commenters statements regarding the interchangeability of the two words could
not be ascertained.17
While in 2020, social media is an everyday or, for some, every hour
occurrence, courts remain focused on the importance of proving authenticity and
relevancy.18 In State v. Sample, the Maryland Court of Appeals found there was
sufficient circumstantial evidence to show the defendant unfriended his alleged
accomplice on social media to hide their association.19 In allowing this social
media evidence into the record, the court determined a reasonable juror could
find it more likely than not the “SoLo Haze” Facebook profile belonged to the
defendant and that the “claude.mayo.5” Facebook profile belonged to his alleged
accomplice.20 The Maryland Court of Appeals, however, only determined there
was enough circumstantial evidence to create “distinctive characteristics” of
ownership. The court came to this decision after considering the two email
addresses attached to the SoLo Haze Facebook, the friends list of the profile that
matched those on the defendant’s witness list, and the Facebook “about me”
section, which mirrored the defendant’s current city, high school, and
university.21 While the Appeals Court determined ownership, the court did not
15

St. Clair v. Johnny’s Oyster & Shrimp, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 773, 774–75 (S.D. Tex.

1999).
16 Moroccanoil, Inc. v. Marc Anthony Cosmetics, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 3d 1203, 1213 (C.D.
Cal. 2014); id. at 1213 n.5.
17 Moroccanoil, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 3d at 1213 n.5. The comments were entered pursuant
to a hearsay exception because Marc Anthony Cosmetics wanted to submit the Facebook to
show how Moroccanoil customers use the term Moroccanoil, rather than use the evidence as
truthful statements. As the truth of the statement could not be ascertained, the comments are
not considered authenticated, but were still entered into the record. Id.; see FED. R. EVID.
801(c)(2).
18 See People v. Price, 29 N.E.3d 1005, 1011 (N.Y. 2017) (holding the government
failed to establish that the website, which included a photo of the defendant holding a
firearm and money, belonged to, and was controlled by, defendant).
19 State v. Sample, 228 A.3d 171, 194 (Md. 2020).
20 Id.
21 Id. at 198–99.
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make any finding regarding the defendant as the person who actually did the
unfriending, as this was a question reserved for the jury.22 This highly
anticipated 2020 case highlights the Maryland court’s role in determining
whether the social media profile belongs to the purported author and the jury’s
role in determining whether the social media evidence is credible.
B. Catfishing and Hacking: Dangers to Society and Authentication
In 2014, 83.09 million accounts on Facebook were deemed fake.23 This
phenomenon has been coined “catfishing” by one of the practice’s most
outspoken victims, Nev Shuman – connecting his victimhood to cod caught by
fishermen.24 Cod fishermen, attempting to produce better quality fish, put a
catfish, cod’s natural predator, in the tank during travel with the cod. 25 This
stimulation causes the codfish to continually swim in the tank, maintaining the
fish’s taste and texture during travel.26 In the online world, the term “catfish” is
used to describe “a person who sets up a false personal profile on a social
networking site for fraudulent or deceptive purposes.”27 Basically, a catfish
stimulates their victim.28 Catfishing has been proven dangerous — leading some
to give money to fake online friends, landing others in jail, and creating a lot of
emotional distress for those that believed to have found love online, only to find
out their online lover lied about their identity, gender, and more. 29
The idea of catfishing is relatively new, taking the world by storm after
22 Id. at 199 (finding that the preponderance of the evidence makes it likely that a
reasonable juror will find it likely that that the social media evidence is what it purports it to
be).
23 Lauren Reichart et al., Follow Me, What’s the Harm? Considerations of Catfishing
and Utilizing Fake Online Persona on Social Media, 27 J. LEGAL ASPECTS OF SPORT 32, 33
(2017).
24 Anna Meerts, How Did Catfishing Come into Our Society?, DIGGIT MAG. (May 12,
2018), https://www.diggitmagazine.com/articles/catfishing.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Catfish, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/catfish
(last visited Nov. 6, 2021).
28 Meerts, supra note 24.
29 Alex J. Coyne, How to Identify a Catfish (and Protect Your Money),
THEDOLLARSTRETCHER, https://www.thedollarstretcher.com/money-problems/how-toidentify-a-catfish/ (last updated Aug. 2021); Andrew Paparella, et al., How NBA Star,
Aspiring Model Became Victims of a Massive Catfishing Scheme Out of Canada, ABC
NEWS (Apr. 13, 2017), https://abcnews.go.com/Technology/nba-star-aspiring-modelvictims-massive-catfishing-scheme/story?id=46755887; Reichart Smith et al., supra note
23, at 37; see Erica Gonzales, Catfished! Girls Scam ISIS on Social Media for Travel
Money, YAHOO (July 29, 2015), https://www.yahoo.com/lifestyle/catfished-girls-scam-isison-social-media-for-125374397897.html?guccounter=1 (explaining how three Chechen
women catfished ISIS out of money on the proposition they would travel to the Islamic state
and join ISIS, but instead, kept the money for leisure).
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college football player, Manti Te’o, was catfished in 2012.30 During the 2012
football season, Notre Dame football fans mourned with Te’o as his online
girlfriend, Lennay Kekua, died of leukemia.31 In reality, however, Kekua was
not real; it was a hoax, orchestrated by Ronaiah Tuiasosopo, a 22-year-old male
struggling with mental illnesses.32 Although the fictitious Kekua (Tuiasosopo)
and Te’o never physically met, they spoke on the phone, with the help of a
female friend of Tuiasosopo, or Tuiasosopo himself, using a specific voice tone
to pretend to be Kekua.33 Unfortunately, Te’o is not alone. Shulman’s “Catfish:
the TV Show” has run for eight seasons and follows Nev and his co-hosts, who
help seemingly normal individuals determine whether their online relationships
are authentic or fictitious.34
The relatively simple form of fraudulent behavior in catfishing means people
do not need to know the complexities of the internet in order to become a security
risk —they just need to know how to create a social media account and know
enough personal facts about another person to create a rapport.35 Maryland
courts have acknowledged such “relative ease” and have created authentication
standards to combat the practice.36 However, given the number of fake social
media accounts and the dangers and traumas associated with catfishing,
catfishing is probably more prevalent than the court anticipated. 37
In addition to fraud, hacking has become more prevalent on the modern
internet as well.38 Security analysts report that a person can hack a Facebook
account just by knowing the Facebook user’s phone number. 39 Although some
30 Colleen Curry et al., Notre Dame: Football Star Manti Te’o Was ‘Catfished’ in
Girlfriend Hoax, ABC NEWS (Jan. 16, 2013), https://abcnews.go.com/US/notre-damefootball-star-manti-teo-dead-girlfriend/story?id=18232374.
31 John Moriello, What Happened to the NFL’s Manti Te’o, Victim of a Famous
Catfishing Hoax?, SPORTSCASTING (Sept. 6, 2020), https://www.sportscasting.com/whathappened-to-the-nfls-manti-teo-victim-of-a-famous-catfishing-hoax/.
32 Paul Myerburg, Tuiasosopo Tells Dr. Phil Why He ‘Killed’ Te’o’s Fake Girlfriend,
USA TODAY (Jan. 31, 2013), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2013
/01/31/roniah-tuiasosopo-manti-teo-dr-phil-interview/1879643/.
33 Id.
34 Catfish: The TV Show, MTV, https://www.mtv.com/shows/55vxjl/catfish-the-tv-show
(last visited Nov. 10, 2021).
35 Understanding Threats in Social Media, DELOITTE (Sept. 2019),
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/sg/Documents/risk/sea-risk-cyber-101part9.pdf.
36 Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415, 422 (Md. 2011) (“[A]nyone can create fictional
personas or gain unauthorized access to another user’s profile . . .”).
37 See supra note 29 and the accompanying text.
38 It Is Easy to Hack Any Social Media Account by Sending SMS, VARDINDIA (Jan. 9,
2020), https://varindia.com/news/it-is-easy-to-hack-any-social-media-account-by-sendingsms.
39 Id.
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knowledge of the internet is needed to accomplish this, all the hacker needs to
do is “infect[] the mobile phone by sending a simple SMS, to influence the
interest, after surveying [the victim’s] profile [o]n social media.” 40 Once the
victim clicks on the offer, the hacker can enter the victim’s social media. 41
In a recent study, twenty-two percent of adults claimed their social media had
been hacked.42 Hacking should not only be thought of as a man hiding in a
basement, hunched over multiple screens using highly technical knowledge, but
rather someone, such as a scorned partner or friend, logging into someone else’s
social media profile without consent.43 To access another person’s social media
page and post something that could be used against them in a court of law, all
that is needed is a known password or known facts that could get a person
through the security questions, such as a “date of birth, address, hometown, or
names of family members and pets.”44 This information can be easily found on
the Facebook “about” profile, or through posts or quizzes on social media sites
that ask questions about someone’s first vehicle, birthdate or school.45 These
are all commonly asked security questions that could be a gateway to social
media hacking.46
C. Social Media Evidence Being Deleted
In order to enter evidence, the proponent of the evidence must show that it is
relevant and real, specifically that the alleged author is the true author. 47 An
attorney has an ethical duty “to preserve evidence aris[ing from] when the party
has notice that the evidence is relevant to litigation or when a party should have
Id.
Id.
42 What to Do When Your Social Media Account Gets Hacked, MCAFEE (July 22, 2020),
https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/consumer/consumer-threat-notices/social-media-accounthacked/ [hereinafter MCAFEE].
43 See Campbell v. State, 382 S.W.3d 545, 548 (Tex. App. 2012) (recognizing that the
appeal turned on the authentication of Facebook messages alleged to have been sent to the
victim, from a scorned partner, after a domestic violence incident); see also Matt Burgess,
How to Know if You’ve Been Hacked, and What to Do About It, WIRED (July 19, 2020),
https://www.wired.com/story/how-to-know-if-youve-been-hacked-and-what-to-do-about-it/.
44 MCAFEE, supra note 42.
45 Carson Burns, Beware of Facebook Posts that Ask You to Share Personal Information
Like Your First Car or Hometown, WBIR (Apr. 15, 2020),
https://www.wbir.com/article/news/crime/beware-of-facebook-posts-that-ask-you-to-sharepersonal-information-like-your-first-car-or-hometown/51-e3b9319f-0dc8-42a7-af0d250323720194.
46 Id.
47 Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415, 423–24 n.12 (Md. 2011) (discussing the authorship of
the MySpace profile); Christine Lozier & Michael Zogby, Authenticating Social Media
Evidence at Trial, JDSUPRA (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/
authenticating-social-media-evidence-at-33843/.
40
41
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known that the evidence may be relevant to future litigation.” 48 Yet, according
to ethics guidelines of the New York State Bar, deleting social media postings
“does not violate the substantive law regarding the destruction or spoliation of
evidence, [since] there is no ethical bar to ‘taking down’ such material from
social media publications, or prohibiting a client’s lawyer from advising the
client to do so.”49 This is because the courts assume that the post is preserved
on the person’s computer or on the social networking site’s records.50 Although
the destruction of evidence is a relevant danger in all trials, this adds another
layer to the troubles in the authentication of social media since there is an added
step to even finding such evidence.
D. Other Ethical Considerations
The discovery of social media evidence may put the attorney in ethical
problems as well. Although such a problem is not relevant to authentication, it
is important for the attorney to keep in mind the ethical considerations in
discovery when finding social media posts or profiles to enter into evidence.
Model Rule of Profession Conduct 4.2 states
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of
the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another
lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is
authorized to do so by law or a court order.51
Thus, attorneys are prohibited from having communications with a person
represented by another attorney, even if such connection is on social media.52
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct has warned that in some jurisdictions,
the use of LinkedIn, a business oriented social networking platform, 53 may
unknowingly violate Model Rules of Professional Conduct rule 4.2 as the
platform sends an automatic notification to the user that their profile was viewed
and indicates who viewed the profile.54 New York, a jurisdiction which views
automatic notification as communication under ABA Professional Conduct rule
48 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting
Fujitsu Ltd. v. Fed. Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 436 (2d Cir. 2001)).
49 SOCIAL MEDIA E THICS GUIDELINES OF THE COM. AND FED. LITIG. SECTION No. 5A
cmt. (N.Y. State Bar Ass’n 2019).
50 Id.
51 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
52 Christina M. Jordan, Discovery of Social Media Evidence in Legal Proceedings, ABA
(Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/gpsolo/publications/gpsolo_
ereport/2020/january-2020/discovery-social-media-evidence-legal-proceedings/.
53 LinkedIn, TECHTERMS, https://techterms.com/definition/linkedin (last updated Mar. 3,
2010).
54 Jordan, supra note 52.
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4.2, states it is the attorney’s job to research individual social media sites
processes in order to “avoid inadvertent communications.”55 However, the same
court allows for lawyers to access public social media pages of other litigants
“as long as the lawyer does not ‘friend’ the other party or direct a third person
to do so.”56
Relatedly, Rule 8.4 prohibits an attorney from “engag[ing] in conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.”57 This further protects
third parties, as it would be a violation of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct for attorneys to essentially catfish, or otherwise deceitfully act in a way
so that, other litigants would divulge meaningful information, or private
information on social media. However, the term “private” is an important phrase
for this scenario because, as seen below, attorneys are able to get almost all posts
and messages directly from social media platforms through certified records.58
Thus, the question of how an attorney receives information turns to what is
considered private; however, this is a question beyond the scope of this article.
II. DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO SOCIAL MEDIA AUTHENTICATION
States generally fall into two camps regarding the requirements for
authenticating social media: the Texas Approach and the Maryland Approach. 59
Texas is considered to be more trusting of social media as it requires a lower
burden of proof than Maryland and accepts “distinctive characteristics as a prima
facie showing of authenticity.”60 Meanwhile, Maryland has an inherent distrust
of social media, “finding the odds too great” that the author is not who he or she
purports to be.61
It is important to understand how different jurisdictions treat social media
authentication because if catfishing or hacking occurs, and the fruits of that
malicious behavior is then proposed as evidence in litigation, it is dangerous to
the defendant if the evidence is admitted. This is the reason social media
55 N.Y. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2012-2 (2012) (referring to jury
research but is relevant to communications to those represented by an attorney, which in this
context, should be understood broadly, and includes not only sending a specific message,
but also any notification to the person being researched that they have been the subject of an
attorney’s research efforts).
56 N.Y. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 843 (2010).
57 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
58 FED. R. EVID. 902(11).
59 Wendy Angus-Anderson, Authenticity and Admissibility of Social Media Website
Printouts, 14 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 33, 37 (2015).
60 Michael Roundy, On the Fundamentals of Authentication, ABA (Feb. 24, 2020),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/pretrial-practicediscovery/articles/2020/winter2020-on-the-fundamentals-of-authentication/.
61 Angus-Anderson, supra note 59, at 37.
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evidence, or evidence in general, must be authenticated before being used in
court.
A. The Texas Approach to Social Media Authentication
According to the Texas Rules of Evidence, “[t]o satisfy the requirement
of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent
claims it is.”62 Typically, the court emphasizes Texas Evidence Rule 901(b)(4)
regarding distinctive characteristics, in which “[t]he appearance, contents,
substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics of the item, taken
together with all the circumstances” satisfies the requirement of authentication.63
The Texas courts have construed this rule to mean that the proponent must
introduce sufficient evidence of authenticity, so that a reasonable jury can
conclude the evidence is authentic.64 This rule leaves the question of relevancy
and verification to the jury, rather than the judge, following both the Texas Rule
of Evidence 401 and Federal Rule of Evidence 401 regarding relevant evidence
as a question of fact.65
This approach to authentication has survived social media and technological
growth, despite the rise in hacking and catfishing.66 New Jersey, which follows
the Texas approach, does not differentiate between tweets and other social media
postings, and physical writings.67 In fact, the court equates the two.68 This lack
of modification for social media evidence stems from the idea that under the
Federal Rule of Evidence 901, the proponent must produce evidence, regardless

TEX. R. EVID. 901(a).
Id. 901(b)(4); see Druery v. State, 225 S.W.3d 491, 502 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)
(considering distinctive characteristics to determine authorship); Tienda v. State, No. 05-0900553-CR, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 10031, at *12–13 (Tex. App. Dec. 17, 2010) (holding a
reasonable jury could find that evidence authentic through distinctive characteristics).
64 Druery, 225 S.W.3d at 502.
65 Parker v. State, 85 A.3d 682, 687 (Del. 2014); FED. R. EVID. 401 (“Evidence is
relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be
without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.”); TEX.
R. EVID. 401 (“Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less
probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in
determining the action.”)
66 ZEROFOX, supra note 11; State v. Hannah, 151 A.3d 99, 105–06 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2016).
67 See Hannah, 151 A.3d at 106 (“The simple fact that a tweet is created on the Internet
does not set it apart from other writings.”).
68 See id. (explaining that the authentication standards are not change whether the
proffer evidence is electronic or physical).
62
63
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of its physical or electronic status, that is what it proports to be.69
In Tienda v. State, a Texas murder trial, the Appeals Court found that a
Myspace profile was properly authenticated under Texas Rule of Evidence
901(a) because the account holder was identified with relevant factors, “taken
as a whole with all of the individual, particular details considered in
combination,” that show authenticity.70 Using distinctive characteristics, the
court held a reasonable juror could find that the evidence had been authenticated
considering the photos could be associated to the defendant by his unique
tattoos, his distinctive eyeglasses and earring, and posts that referenced the
victim’s death, funeral, and defendant’s arrest.71 States that adopt Texas’s
approach use similar factors to connect the social media evidence to defendants.
B. The Maryland Approach to Social Media Authentication
States that follow the Maryland approach demonstrate an inherent mistrust of
the internet and social media, resulting in a heightened burden of proof for
authenticating evidence.72 The Maryland Rule of Evidence 5-901 states that
“[t]he requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to
admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what its proponent claims.”73 Maryland courts have held
that, in order to authenticate social media evidence, “the admitting party should
either: (1) ask the purported creator if [he or she] created the profile or the post,
(2) search the internet history and hard drive of the purported creator’s computer
‘to determine whether that computer was used to originate the social networking
profile and posting in question,’ or (3) ‘obtain information directly from the
social networking website that links the establishment of the profile to the person
who allegedly created it and also links the posting sought to be introduced to the
person who initiated it.’”74
69 See id. (citing KENNETH BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 108 (7d ed. 2013)
(“Despite the seeming novelty of social network-generated documents, courts have applied
the existing concepts of authentication under Federal Rule 901 to them, including the reply
letter doctrine and content known only to the participants.”)); FED. R. EVID. 901(a).
70 Tienda v. State, No. 05-09-00553-CR, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 10031, at *11–12
(Dec. 17, 2010) aff’d, 358 S.W.3d 633, 645, 647 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (“Because there
was sufficient circumstantial evidence to support a finding that the exhibits were what they
purported to be—MySpace pages the contents of which the appellant was responsible for—
we affirm the trial judge and the court of appeals which had both concluded the same.”).
71 Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 647 (noting that in Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the court
looks at Maryland’s Griffin case discussed later and disagreed with the Maryland court’s
aversion to circumstantial evidence).
72 Roundy, supra note 60.
73 MD. R. EVID. 5-901.
74 Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415, 428–29 (Md. 2011); see Sublet v. State, 113 A.3d 695,
713 (Md. 2015). But see Parker v. State, 85 A.3d 682, 686–87 (Del. 2014) (rejecting the
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Similar to the Texas Rules of Evidence and Federal Rules of Evidence, the
Maryland Rules of Evidence allows for “circumstantial evidence” such as
“appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, location, [and] other
distinctive characteristics.”75 Keeping with Maryland’s system, however, such
circumstantial evidence must still comply with the heightened standard
regarding who is able to authenticate such evidence.76
In the three consolidated cases in Sublet v. State, the court identified certain
facts to authenticate evidence derived from social networking websites pursuant
to the Maryland Rules of Evidence.77 In the first consolidated case, Sublet v.
State, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that the Facebook posts were not
properly admitted into evidence due to lack of sufficient authentication, as the
Facebook page owner denied making the comments, and the social media pages,
in general, were “devoid of unique characteristics.”78 The Court found the
proposed owner’s denial credible, as witness denial of personal knowledge
regarding the proffered item “necessarily undercuts the notion of authenticity.”79
Next, in Harris v. State, the second consolidated case, the Court held the Twitter
direct messages and tweets were properly authenticated considering the
circumstantial evidence, such as the alleged author’s Twitter name and
photographs, and messages on the purported social media profile included the
personal knowledge of the shooting at core in the case.80 In the last consolidated
case, Monge-Martinez v. State, the Appeals Court determined the Facebook
messages in question had enough distinctive characteristics considering the
“limited number of people knowledgeable of the incident as well as the use of
Spanish in each message.”81 Although this may seem similar to the distinctive
characteristic showing in Texas, Maryland established a preponderance of the
evidence standard in Sublet, which leaves less decision up to a jury as the

Maryland approach and adopting the Texas standard as the Texas standard does not require
three ways to authenticate social media evidence).
75 MD. R. EVID. 5-901(b)(4); FED. R. E VID. 901(b)(4); TEX. R. E VID. 901(b)(4); Sublet,
113 A.3d at 711 (“[A]uthentication of a writing also could be obtained were the contents or
subject matter of the writing to ‘contain circumstantial evidence indicating the identity of its
author.’”).
76 See Griffin, 19 A.3d at 424 (“[t]he picture of [the girlfriend], coupled with her birth
date and location, were not sufficient ‘distinctive characteristics’ on a MySpace profile to
authenticate its printout . . .”).
77 Sublet, 113 A.3d at 711.
78 Id. at 719.
79 Id.at 718–19.
80 Id. at 719–21.
81 Id. at 722. See FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(4) (“The appearance, contents, substance,
internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics of the item, taken together with all the
circumstances.”).
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Maryland courts require authentication prior to admitting evidence to a jury. 82
Consequentially, in Maryland, the judge acts as a gatekeeper in determining
whether the preponderance of the evidence indicates “‘sufficient proof . . . so
that a reasonable juror could find in favor of authenticity or identification’”
before the question is turned over to the jury to find whether the evidence is what
it purports to be.83 The Maryland courts have held that the determination of
evidence purporting what it claims to be is a question of fact, thus must be left
up to the jury.84
C. Comparing and Contrasting the Two Approaches
The textual difference between the Maryland and Texas evidence rules are
almost nonexistent.85 Yet, the two jurisdictions construe the similar language
very differently—specifically in terms of what is considered admissible
distinctive characteristics in each jurisdiction, and who can testify to such
characteristics in the postings and profiles.86 Both states agree on a “reasonable
juror” test: it is up to a reasonable juror to decide whether the evidence is
sufficient and authentic as to allow such evidence to be used in the criminal
proceedings.87 Yet, the Maryland approach has a heightened burden—
preponderance of the evidence. Maryland’s preponderance of the evidence
standard coupled with the three authentication methods, are both missing from
the Texas approach. This difference shows that comparatively, the Texas
82 Sublet, 113 A.3d at 715, 722. See Denise A. Blake, Recent Development Sublet v.
State: Authentication of Evidence from Social Networking Websites Requires a Trial Judge
to Find Sufficient Proof from which a Reasonable Juror Could Conclude that the Evidence
Is What the Proponent Claims it to Be, 46 U. BALT. L. F. 80, 82 (2015).
83 Sublet, 113 A.3d at 715 (quoting United States v. Vayner, 769 F.3d 125, 129–130 (2d
Cir. 2014)).
84 Id. at 715.
85 Compare MD. R. EVID. 5-901(a) (“The requirement of authentication or identification
as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.”), with TEX. R. EVID. 901(a)
(“To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the
proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the
proponent claims it is.”). For the sake of short examination of the extensive Evidence rules,
the comparing of the Texas and Maryland’s general provision should be enough to ascertain
the similarities.
86 Compare MD. R. EVID. 5-901(a) (“The requirement of authentication or identification
as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.”), with TEX. R. EVID. 901(a)
(“To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the
proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the
proponent claims it is.”).
87 State v. Sample, 228 A.3d 171, 174 (Md. 2020); United States v. Vayner, 769 F.3d
125, 129–30 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Pluta, 176 F.3d 43, 49 (2d Cir. 1999)).
See MD. R. EVID. 5-901; TEX. R. EVID. 901.
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standard is too low.88 As discussed below, however, even if the Maryland
approach did not have such heightened burden, the Texas approach would still
violate due process.
In Griffin v. State, the Maryland Court of Appeals determined that the
proffered Myspace profile of the defendant’s girlfriend did not have distinctive
characteristics that could lead to authentication.89 Although printed pages of the
“profile in the name of ‘Sistasouljah,’ described a 23 year-old female from Port
Deposit, listing her birthday as ‘10/02/1983’ and containing a photograph of
[the] embracing couple,” the Myspace page was not admissible.90 The Maryland
Court of Appeals prohibited the profile from being entered as evidence because
the government used a police officer to authenticate the screenshot of the
Myspace page.91 As the police officer was not the purported creator, the internet
history/hard drive of the purported author’s computer, nor information directly
from the social networking site, the police officer is not able to testify to the
authenticity of the social media postings according to the Maryland standard. 92
The case was thus, remanded to comply with Maryland’s authentication
standard, requiring the evidence be authenticated by either (1) the girlfriend (the
purported author); (2) self-authenticating computer history or hard drive records
that show the computer of the girlfriend “was used to originate the social
networking profile”; or (3) by a representative of MySpace, or selfauthenticating business documents from MySpace, that could “link[] the
establishment of the profile to the person.”93 This three-option approach creates
a heightened burden of sufficient proof that protects the defendant from unfair
legal action. Furthermore, the preponderance of the evidence standard requires
more than a few distinctive characteristics so that the jury can hold the evidence
is more likely than not authentic.94
Differently, in Garcia v. State, the Texas Court of Appeals held there was
enough evidence to convict the defendant of murder based on
a fake Facebook profile used to lure the victim to a mobile home park where he
was attacked and killed.95 The mutual ex-girlfriend of both the victim and
88 E.g. Blake, supra note 82, at 82 (demonstrating that the Maryland approach has a
higher standard than the Texas approach).
89 Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415, 418 (Md. 2011).
90 Id.
91 Id. at 423.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 427–28.
94 See Kevin M. Clermont, Trial by Traditional Probability, Relative Plausibility, Or
Belief Function?, 66 CASE W. RES . L. REV. 353, 371 (2015) (“The standard of
preponderance of the evidence translates into a more-likely-than-not standard. It is the usual
standard in civil litigation, but it appears throughout law.”).
95 Garcia v. State, No. 06-15-00187-CR, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 12117, at *1, *24
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defendant testified that “Monica,” the victim’s girlfriend who he met on
Facebook, was not a real person and the defendant created the profile to foster a
relationship with and trick the victim solely through the internet.96 The
defendant’s sister also testified that the defendant created the fake profile,
however, on cross examination, the sister testified that the defendant never
admitted he created the “Monica” account.97 Additionally, the police detective
testified that the defendant knew the “Monica” Facebook name and password. 98
The defendant testified and denied killing the victim and creating the
“Monica” Facebook page.99 Rather, he claimed his ex-girlfriend was the one
that created and pursued a relationship with the victim online. 100 The court held
that a reasonable juror could find that the defendant, regardless of the Facebook
evidence, caused the victim’s death, and consequently, admitted the evidence. 101
Though the outcome in these cases contrast each other, they are similar in that
a police officer, and others, testified to the authentication of the social media
page in both the Maryland and Texas cases. In Maryland, this process was
considered an error, but it was allowed in Texas, illustrating that the standard in
Maryland is significantly higher.102 While the Texas Appeals Court in Garcia v.
State had evidence — other than the Facebook page — that proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant murdered the victim, such finding does not
excuse the fact the Facebook page should not have been entered into evidence,
especially considering the court’s statement: “either [the defendant] or [the exgirlfriend] created the false Monica Facebook page.”103 This would not pass
muster in Maryland, considering it does not fulfill the more-likely-than-not
requirement rooted in the preponderance of the evidence standard.104
Additionally, Maryland has held that when a proffered author denies authorship
of a posting or profile, it “necessarily undercuts the notion of authenticity.”105
There is evidence admitted by the Texas Appeals Court, that the purported
author of the fraudulent Myspace profile could be a different person; yet the
“Monica” profile was still admitted into evidence.106

(Nov. 10, 2016).
96 Id. at *7–9.
97 Id. at *11, *13.
98 Id. at *16.
99 Id. at *19.
100 Id.
101 Id. at *26.
102 Compare id. at *16, with Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415, 418 (Md. 2011).
103 Garcia, No. 06-15-00187-CR, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 12117, at *24.
104 Clermont, supra note 94, at 372 (explaining the burden of proofs needed for different
case types).
105 Sublet v. State, 113 A.3d 695, 718–19 (Md. 2015) (citing Makowski v. Mayor &
Balt., 94 A.3d 91, 108 (Md. 2014)).
106 Garcia, No. 06-15-00187-CR, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 12117, at *24.
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This difference between Maryland’s and Texas’ standard is illustrated in
Tienda v. State, where the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals court analyzed
Maryland’s Griffin v. State case.107 In Griffin v. State, the Maryland Court of
Appeals focused on the ease of creating a fictitious account.108 Yet, the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals found that there was enough circumstantial evidence
corroborating the Myspace page in Tienda to justify the admittance.109 In
arriving at this conclusion, the Texas Criminal Appeals Court used the Maryland
Appeals Court’s own words:
The potential for abuse and manipulation of a social networking site
by someone other than its purported creator and/or user leads to our
conclusion that a printout of an image from such a site requires a
greater degree of authentication than merely identifying the date of
birth of the creator and her visage in a photograph on the site in order
to reflect that [the defendant’s girlfriend] was its creator and the
author of [the threatening language posted thereon].110
In comparing the two cases, Texas looks at the evidence of Maryland’s Griffin
to show only a birthday, location, and a photograph as sufficient distinctive
characteristics.111 However, Texas, in Tienda, found a picture of the defendant
and posts referencing the victim’s death and the defendant’s arrest to be more
convincing of authentication.112 Viewed in totality, the evidence in the two cases
do not seem so different, yet the evidence in the Tienda case was considered
enough to be presented to the jury.113 This dichotomy between Texas and
Maryland is based on the burden each jurisdiction has in determining whether
the proffered evidence is sufficiently supported before it is ultimately a question
for the jury.114

107 Tienda v. State, 358 S.W.3d 633, 646 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (citing Griffin v. State,
19 A.3d 415, 427 (Md. 2011)).
108 Id. at 646 (citing Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415, 427 (Md. 2011)).
109 Id. at 647.
110 Id. at 646 (quoting Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415, 424 (Md. 2011)).
111 Id. (citing Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415, 424 (Md. 2011)).
112 Tienda v. State, No. 05-09-00553-CR, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 10031, at *11–12
(Dec. 17, 2010).
113 See Tienda v. State, 358 S.W.3d 633, 647 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (“[T]here are far
more circumstantial indicia of authenticity in this case than in Griffin.”).
114 Id. (“The ultimate question of authenticity [is submitted] to the jury.”); Sublet v.
State, 113 A.3d 695, 715 (Md. 2015) (citing United States v. Vayner, 769 F.3d 125, 130 (2d
Cir. 2014)) (“[T]he jury ultimately is left to make the ‘determination as to whether the
evidence is, in fact, what its proponent claims.’”).

2021]

You Can't Trust Everything On the Internet

177

III. DUE PROCESS IS VIOLATED
If unauthentic evidence forms basis of a defendant’s conviction, the
defendant’s due process rights have been violated. The Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution provide that no one shall be
“deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”115 In a
criminal proceeding, a defendant can have his or her life and liberty taken away
through jail time––that is why the procedure is so important. When a
defendant’s liberty is at risk, the defendant must be completely heard by the
court in order to avoid oppression from the government.116 In order to allow a
defendant to be completely heard by the court, the “government must follow fair
procedures.”117 If the government denies due process, the government’s actions
are unconstitutional––even if the action is proscribed by law. 118
A. Eyewitness Testimony
Eyewitness testimony is a classic example of evidence that includes a lawfully
proscribed process, but famously denies many defendants due process.119 In
Stovall v. Denno, the defendant, a Black man, was identified by the White female
victim as the individual who stabbed her in her home.120 This identification
occurred after the defendant was brought into the victim’s hospital room,
handcuffed by police officers.121 The Supreme Court held that the process of
identification “was so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable
mistaken identification that he was denied due process of law.”122 This holding
created a connection between unreliable evidence and due process violations by
stating “unnecessarily suggestive” evidence is so unfair to a defendant that it
denies the defendant their rights to life, liberty, and property. 123

115 U.S. CONST. amend. V (referring to the federal court system); id. amend. XIV, §1
(referring to the state court system).
116 Matthew R. Schreck, Preventing “You’ve Got Mail” From Meaning “You’ve Been
Served”: How Service of Process by Email Does Not Meet Constitutional Due Process
Requirements, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1121, 1121 (2005); see Gen. Motors Corp. v.
Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 191 (1992).
117 Peter Strauss, Due Process, LEGAL INFO. INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/due_process (last visited Nov. 11, 2020).
118 Id.
119 Keith A. Findley, Judicial Gatekeeping of Suspect Evidence: Due Process and
Evidentiary Rules in the Age of Innocence, 47 GA. L. REV. 723, 732 (2013).
120 See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 295 (1967).
121 Id.
122 Id. at 302.
123 Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 442 (1969) (finding the defendants due process
rights were violated as the identification processes made such identification “all but
inevitable”).
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Similarly, in Maryland, the Appeals Court in Sublet v. State stated that it is
easy for a juror to imply parts of the case just by looking at a particular object.124
The court explained “‘It is easy for a jury, when witnesses speak of a horse being
stolen from Doe by Roe, to understand, [that] when Doe is proved to have lost
the horse, that it still remains to be proved that Roe took it,’” but, by having a
witness to the theft bring the horse into the courtroom, it would persuade the jury
as “‘it were, a part of the witness’ testimony, [tending] to verify the [missing]
remainder’” that Roe took the horse.125 Reminiscent of the Supreme Court’s
discussion of “unnecessarily suggestive” evidence in Stovall, the Maryland
Court in Sublet emphasized the inability of most juries to separate the implied
facts from the genuine facts of evidence.126
The Supreme Court later determined that unreliable evidence is not bound by
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but rather through
evidentiary rules of the courts.127 By backtracking on the due process
procedures “[t]he Court made explicit the constitutional insignificance of
evidential reliability” and ignored the connection between unreliable evidence
and due process violations.128 Later in 2012, however, the Supreme Court
overruled their previous evidentiary rules determination by holding, in Perry v.
New Hampshire, that “[t]he Constitution . . . protects a defendant against a
conviction based on evidence of questionable reliability, not by prohibiting
introduction of the evidence, but by affording the defendant means to persuade
the jury that the evidence should be discounted as unworthy of credit.”129 This
rule is consistent with both the current Maryland and Texas approaches, which
tasks the juries with “determining the reliability of the evidence presented at
trial.”130
B. Eyewitness Testimony Standard Applied
Pursuant to the Perry v. New Hampshire decision, it is the federal and state
governments’ job to protect the defendant from unreliable evidence resulting in
the deprivation of liberty.131 Therefore, it is the job of the states, including those

124 Sublet v. State, 113 A.3d 695, 709 (Md. 2015) (quoting 7 Wigmore, Evidence § 2129
(Chadborun Rev. 1978)).
125 Id.
126 Id. at 709–10.
127 Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986).
128 Findley, supra note 119, at 732.
129 Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 237 (2012).
130 Id.
131 Id.(“[S]tate and federal statutes and rules ordinarily govern the admissibility of
evidence . . .”).
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following Texas’s approach to social media authentication, to protect its citizens
from due process violations. At first glance, the Texas approach appears to fit
within the Supreme Court’s holding in Perry. However, the ease of catfishing
and hacking and the difficulty in determining a whether the profile or post is
fictitious has led to the need for a higher standard of authentication. Maryland’s
gatekeeping approach, which forces judges to determine the preponderance of
the evidence before the jury finds true authenticity, creates procedural limits that
prevent questionable evidence from entering,132 while still “affording the
[opponent] means to persuade the jury.”133 Theoretically, the evidence is already
determined by the judge to be at least 51% authentic, making it less likely that
the evidence is not authentic, thus, the opponent is afforded the right to persuade
the jury of that 49% possible authenticity is unreliable.134
The Maryland approach, however, is not free from criticism. In State v.
Sample, the Court of Appeals did not determine if it was another person was
fraudulently acting on the defendant’s Facebook when the accomplice was
removed from the defendant’s friends list.135 The Court held that the
requirement “to somehow conclusively disprove that someone other than” the
defendant unfriended the victim was too high a standard for authentication
purposes.136 In desiring to keep the social media authentication high, so as not
to allow for fictious accounts in evidence, the Appeals Court upheld the
reasonable juror test.137 In this case, it allowed the jury to determine whether it
was more likely than not that the defendant unfriended the accomplice. 138 The
Appeals Court in State v. Sample determined it was too high of a standard to
make the defendant prove fraudulent actions existed on his social media,
allowing such social media evidence in the record, however the jury was still
able to conclude that the Facebook belonged to the defendant and the
circumstances led to the unfriending by the defendant.139

Sublet v. State, 113 A.3d 695, 708 (Md. 2015).
Perry, 565 U.S. at 237.
134 Evidentiary Standards and Burdens of Proof, JUSTIA (May 2019),
https://www.justia.com/trials-litigation/lawsuits-and-the-court-process/evidentiarystandards-and-burdens-of-proof [hereinafter JUSTIA] (“Some scholars define the
preponderance of the evidence standard as requiring a finding that at least 51 percent of the
evidence favors the [proponent’s] outcome.”).
135 State v. Sample, 228 A.3d 171, 199 (Md. 2020).
136 Id.
137 Id. See Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415, 421 (Md. 2011) (“The concern arises because
anyone can create fictitious account and masquerade under another person’s name or can
gain access to another’s account by obtaining the user’s username and password . . .”).
138 Sample, 228 A.3d at 199.
139 Id.
132
133
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C. The Texas Standard is Too Low
The Texas standard for reliability is so low it could easily offend a defendant’s
due process rights. Maryland’s law puts the burden on the proponent to show
that the evidence is sufficient to conclude that the social media evidence is
authentic, while the Texas law puts the burden on the proponent to show the
social media posting could be real, then shifts the burden to the opponent to show
that the social media postings are falsified—a higher burden than the one on the
proponent.140 Texas does not have the preponderance of the evidence standard,
which requires the proponent to prove the authenticity at a theoretical 51%
minimum, as seen in Maryland.141 While the Maryland approach also switches
the burden to show the social media postings are unauthentic,142 the proponent
of the evidence has a high standard to begin with, which is in place to catch such
falsified social media posting and profiles.143
The lack of safeguards under Texas law to protect defendants from irrelevant
and unauthentic social media creates a backwards view of the United States
judicial system. The United States judicial system can be summed up in the
presumption in the American justice system that someone is innocent until
proven guilty. This standard, first established by Coffin v. United States in 1895,
forces the government to prove “each essential element of the crime charged”
beyond a reasonable doubt.144 In this rebuttable presumption of innocence,
“proof resulting from the evidence” leads to guilt, but only if the evidence proves
such guilt.145
Following that standard, the proponent should have to prove that the evidence
was created by the proffered author. Although the evidence rules are nearly
identical in Maryland and Texas, the case law in the respective states have made
the burdens different in regards to authentication.146 Maryland does this by the
preponderance of the evidence standard, which forces the proponent to bring in
evidence that proves that the defendant authored a social media post in order to

Tienda v. State, 358 S.W.3d 633, 646–47 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
Id. at 638; see JUSTIA, supra note 134.
142 Sample, 228 A.3d at 199 (“[N]ot required to eliminate all possibilities that were
inconsistent with authenticity . . .”).
143 See Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415, 422 (Md. 2011).
144 Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895); Presumption of Innocence, LEGAL
INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/presumption_of_innocence (last visited Nov.
9, 2021).
145 Coffin, 156 U.S. at 460 (“For in all systems of law legal presumptions are treated as
evidence giving rise to resulting proof to the full extent of their legal efficacy.”).
146 Compare Tienda v. State, 358 S.W.3d 633 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012), with Griffin, 19
A.3d 415.
140
141
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pass the gatekeeper—the judge.147 Meanwhile, Texas forces the opponent to
prove he did not author the proposed evidence. This allows unauthentic
evidence into court, and act as the basis for the defendant’s conviction, which
will directly violate the defendant’s right to life and liberty.148 Thus, Texas
needs to change and add a higher burden of proof to act as a safeguard against
such due process violations.
D. Maryland Must Fix Their Standard As Well
Maryland’s third authentication method, which requires records to be
obtained by the social media site in order to link the social media user and
defendant, is essentially the court calling for metadata—information about data
that is invisible to users of the website but gives the website owner information
about the user of the website.149 With metadata, websites have access to
information such as where a photo was uploaded, who has shared it, or who even
looked at it.150 Essentially, the metadata is a social media user’s digital
footprint.151
If anything, Maryland may be too strict and unrealistic, excluding legitimate
evidence that does not comply with the state’s testimonial requirements. Many
large social media companies such as Facebook rarely, if ever, send their
employees testify regarding this information.152 In fact, the author has been
unable to find a Maryland criminal case in which a Facebook employee testified
to the authentication of a Facebook post. However, in State v. Sample, the
defendant’s attorney attempted to call a Facebook employee as a witness, to
which the Maryland Appeals Court denied such request for not being related to
Facebook authentication since Facebook’s business records were already being
used and were considered self-authenticated.153 According to the Court in
Griffin, the third method of authentication, which the court explained as
See Sublet v. State, 113 A.3d 695, 709 (Md. 2015).
U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, §1.
149 Social Media Metadata: Facebook Open Graph and Twitter Cards, WEBSITE SITE
DESIGN INC., https://www.websightdesign.com/services/internet-marketing/search-engineoptimization/social-media-metadata (last visited Nov. 9, 2021).
150 Zak Doffman, Facebook Embeds ‘Hidden Codes’ to Track Who Sees and Shares
Your Photos, FORBES (June 14, 2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2019/07/14/facebook-is-embedding-hiddencodes-to-track-all-your-uploaded-photos-report/?sh=67b3b4a41592.
151 Chapter 3 – Metadata, Tracking, and the User’s Experience, GRANITE STATE
COLLEGE, https://granite.pressbooks.pub/comm601/chapter/metadata-tracking-and-theusers-experience/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2021).
152 Information for Law Enforcement Authorities, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com
/safety/groups/law/guidelines/?_rdr (last visited Nov. 9, 2021) [hereinafter FACEBOOK].
153 State v. Sample, 228 A.3d 171, 176–77 (Md. 2020) (denying the request for being
untimely).
147
148
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“obtain[ing] information directly from the social networking website,” is rooted
in the outcome of People v. Clevenstine.154 Yet, in the New York Appellate
Court, a legal compliance officer from Myspace testified in People v.
Clevenstine to messages between a defendant and victim located on the
defendant’s home computer, which was contradictory to the defendant’s theory
of hacking.155
According to Facebook, “records are self-authenticating pursuant to law and
should not require the testimony of a records custodian.”156 This is in line with
Federal Rules of Evidence 902(11) as records compiled as a regularly conducted
activity, which is similar to business records compiled as a part of regular
business activity.157 While business records and certified domestic records do
not require testimony to show admissibility,158 both Facebook and the Maryland
court look past the reason social media authentication should still be required—
metadata. Metadata would give the court a full picture, and not a repeat of easily
ascertainable information found on the social media profile.159 The Facebook
business records for the SoLaze profile, in State v. Sample, admitted to the
Maryland Trial Court as exhibit A reads:

Target 100009404335910
Generated 2015-12-17 19:40:24 UTC
Date Range 2015-12-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2015-12-17 23:59:59 UTC
***
Name First SoLo

Middle
Last Haze
Registered 100009404335910@facebook.com
E[-]mail mrsample2015@gmail.com

Addresses
Vanity Name
Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415, 428 (Md. 2011).
People v. Clevenstine, 891 N.Y.S.2d 511, 514 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009).
156 FACEBOOK, supra note 152. See FED. R. EVID. 902(11) (“The original or a copy of a
domestic record … as shown by a certification of the custodian or another qualified person
that complies with a federal statute or a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court.”).
157 See FED. R. EVID. 902(11) (“The original or a copy of a domestic record that meets
the requirements of Rule 803(6)(A)-(C), as shown by a certification of the custodian or
another qualified person that complies with a federal statute or a rule prescribed by the
Supreme Court.”).
158 MD. R. EVID. 5-902(b)(1) (“Testimony of authenticity as a condition precedent to
admissibility is not required as to the original or a duplicate of a record of regularly
conducted business activity”); FED. R. EVID. 902(11).
159 What is Metadata Tagging? MERLINONE, https://merlinone.com/what-is-metadatatagging/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2021).
154
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***
Current City Baltimore, Maryland (112438218775062)
Connections Zodiac Signs (1616634441885213)
Edmondson-Westsid High School (230382833645773)
Towson University (33627530544)
Removed User Claude Mayo (100009340905913)

Friends
Time 2015-12-09 02:36:22 UTC
Removed By 100009404335910160
This information is telling, as it explains time of the unfriending and the
connection between the two profiles; however, it is no better than printing out a
Facebook profile or the “about me” section. For this reason, the true downfall
in the use of Maryland’s social media rule is the third method of authenticity,
which allows for the evidence to be authenticated if it is “obtain[ed] information
directly from the social networking website.”161 Thus, Maryland courts construe
evidence taken directly from the social networking site, such as Facebook
records, as self-authenticating and not requiring testimony. 162 In reality, if
Maryland truly wanted to protect defendants from possible due process
violations and follow the Clevenstine decision, the social media records should
not be self-authenticated, or at the very least, should allow the defendant to agree
to the self-authentication and waive the ability to bring a record’s custodian in
to authenticate the evidence.
IV. CHANGES NEEDED
Due process is the reason the justice system has evidence reliability standards,
whether it is for eyewitness testimony, social media authentication, or physical
evidence—the evidence must be what it purports to be.163 When it comes to
technology, pretending to be the defendant is easy—one can hack into another’s
social media just by guessing a password or security question, one can hack into
a server, or one can catfish and pretend to be someone else. However, it is not
as easy to rebut.164
According to the Federal Rules of Evidence, evidence is considered relevant
State v. Sample, 228 A.3d 171, 177–78 (Md. 2020).
Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415, 428 (Md. 2011).
162 FACEBOOK, supra note 152; MD. R. EVID. 5-902 (“A copy of an official record or
report or entry therein, . . . , including data compilations, certified as correct by the
custodian or other person authorized to make the certification, by certificate complying with
this Rule or complying with any applicable statute or these rules.”).
163 See FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(1) (“Testimony that an item is what it is claimed to be.”).
164 Burgess, supra note 43 (“Discovering if you have been hacked can be a rather
complicated task.”).
160
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if it has “any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.”165 This is thought to be the first step of authentication—
something that is needed before even determining whether the proffered
evidence is real and authentic.166 This notion of making “a fact more or less
probable” is what turns this question of genuine social media evidence into a
potential due process violation. If the proffered social media evidence is what
makes the defendant’s charge more probable, and such proffered evidence is not
authentic, yet admitted, the defendant’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights
have been violated.167 Thus, the process that is needed in the authentication of
social media in the court system must filter out unreliable and false postings and
profiles, while still allowing truly authentic evidence to be admitted.
The Federal Rules of Evidence state that “[t]he court must decide any
preliminary question about whether . . . evidence is admissible.”168 In
determining whether the evidence is admissible, evidence can be introduced to
support a finding that the relevant facts exist.169 It is up to the jury to weigh that
evidence and determine its creditability.170 Thus, if any of the sediments of
unauthentic social media are not filtered by Maryland’s preponderance of the
evidence standard, it is up to the jury to determine if the social media post or
profile is creditable and to determine what weight to give it in the consideration
of conviction.171
A. Texas Should Adopt the Maryland Approach
In Maryland, the preponderance of the evidence standard acts as a filter that
is supposed to remove any unreliable and false social media postings and
profiles. Before the case goes to the decider of whether the defendants’ right to
life and liberty are taken away through jailtime, the jury, the judge must
determine there is sufficient proof for a rational jury to conclude that the social
media post or profile is what it purported to be.172 The judge essentially acts as
a gatekeeper against unreliable evidence. This gatekeeper phenomenon used in
Maryland most likely stems from the perception of juries having the tendency to

FED. R. EVID. 401(a).
See Angus-Anderson, supra note 59, at 35.
167 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, §1.
168 FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
169 Id. 104(b).
170 Id. 104(e).
171 See FED. R. EVID. 104(b).
172 Washington v. State, 961 A.2d 1110, 1116 (Md. 2008) (quoting 3 Wigmore on
Evidence § 790 at 219-220 (Chadbourn rev., Little, Brown & Co. 1970)) (explaining that
evidence needs “adequate foundation” for authentication purposes).
165
166
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assume facts about the case.173 If a piece of evidence has sufficient proof to be
authentic, the next filter is weight and creditability as determined by the jury.174
In Maryland, if any unreliable evidence is missed by the judge during trial, a
reasonable jury is able to pick out unauthentic evidence by affording it less
weight.175 In Texas, there is no initial filter— “the ultimate question of
authenticity [is submitted] to the jury.”176 The entire determination of
authenticity falls on a reasonable jury to conclude whether the evidence is
sufficient and genuine, which may, in turn, cloud the jury’s perception of its
creditability.177 The jury, as ultimate determiner of authenticity may also violate
Texas and Federal Rule of Evidence 104(b) considering that the court is tasked
with the question of admissibility and admissibility rests of relevancy and
authentication.178 Thus, if the jury is to determine authentication of proffered
social media evidence, then the Texas court is literally entering every piece of
proffered evidence through Rule 104(b), allowing evidence to be admitted “on
the condition that the proof be introduced later.”179 With such authenticity
standard relying on Rule 104(b), Texas requires almost no standard for
authentication, but a high standard to prove unauthenticity.
However, in State v. Sample, the Maryland court did not conclude the
defendant was the one that actually did the unfriending, as it is the jury’s decision
to determine whether the defendant actually unfriended their alleged
accomplice.180 Applying Maryland Evidence Rule 104(b), Maryland courts
have determined that the ultimate question for authenticity is whether a jury
could find the conditional fact by a preponderance of the evidence.181 Here, the
Maryland Appeals Court determined that by the preponderance of the evidence,
there was “sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to find that it is more likely
than not that the social media evidence is what the proponent of the evidence
Sublet v. State, 113 A.3d 695, 709 (Md. 2015).
FED. R. EVID. 104(e) (“This rule does not limit a party’s right to introduce before the
jury evidence that is relevant to the weight or credibility of other evidence.”).
175 See MD. R. EVID. 5-104 (“This rule does not limit the right of a party to introduce
before the trier of fact evidence relevant to weight or credibility.”).
176 Tienda v. State, 358 S.W.3d 633, 647 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
177 Id. at 634 (“[T]he trial court itself need not be persuaded that the proffered evidence
is authentic.”).
178 FED. R. EVID. 104(b); TEX. R. E VID. 104(b) (“When the relevance of evidence
depends on whether a fact exists, proof must be introduced sufficient to support a finding
that the fact does exist. The court may admit the proposed evidence on the condition that the
proof be introduced later.”).
179 TEX. R. EVID. 104(b).
180 State v. Sample, 228 A.3d 171, 198 (Md. 2020).
181 Id. at 194; MD. R. EVID. 5-104(b) (“When the relevance of evidence depends upon the
fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction
of evidence sufficient to support a finding by the trier of fact that the condition has been
fulfilled.”).
173
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purports it to be,” ultimately finding the evidence authentic.182 Thus, it was not
up for the Maryland jury to determine the authenticity, but rather the credibility
of the evidence.183
Although a judge in Texas, such as in Maryland, does have to find evidence
is able to go onto the jury, the standard for Texas judge’s determination is lower
than Maryland’s standard. In Texas the “gatekeeping function” as determined
by the seminal case Tienda v. State is “whether the proponent of the evidence
has supplied facts that are sufficient to support a reasonable jury determination
that the evidence he has proffered is authentic.”184 Thus, a proponent just needs
to show that the proffered evidence could be factual. Texas does not even
require that the evidence is likely to be true before going to the jury, as the entire
basis for evidence admittance is based in “support . . . that the fact does exist.” 185
Texas is setting a low standard.
Maryland’s preponderance of the evidence standard, which is considered
necessary in connection with the reasonable juror test, is not present in the Texas
line of cases.186 This lower standard means authentic evidence can easily be
considered unreliable despite the dangers and anonymity of social media.187
This unreliable standard is evident due to the lack of concern Texas has with
regard to social media. In a 2019 Texas appellate case, Frelix v. State, the
Seventh District Texas Court of Appeals found social media evidence has
different challenges as it “is susceptible to fabrication, hacking, and
manipulation.”188 Yet, this stated concern is only remedied through testimony
of a personal witness, circumstantial evidence, or distinctive characteristics. 189
An authentication process is supposed to protect against the possible
“fabrication, hacking, and manipulation”190 in social media, considering that
many times, catfishers and hackers will try to make the post or profile realistic
so to be believable.191 Yet, the Texas courts find such plausibility of a believable
Sample, 228 A.3d at 195.
Id. at 184; see MD. R. EVID. 5-104.
184 Tienda v. State, 358 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
185 TEX. R. EVID. 104(b).
186 See generally Tienda, 358 S.W.3d 633; Dering v. State, 465 S.W.3d 668 (Tex. App.
2015); Garcia v. State, No. 06-15-00187-CR, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 12117 (Nov. 10,
2016).
187 United States v. Vayner, 769 F.3d 125, 130 (2d Cir. 2014).
188 Frelix v. State, No. 07-18-00290-CR, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 8322, at *8 (Sep. 13,
2019).
189 Id.; see Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 638; TEX. R. EVID. 901(b).
190 Frelix, No. 07-18-00290-CR, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 8322, at *8.
191 Dan Brennan, Signs of Catfishing, WEBMD (Dec. 3, 2020),
https://www.webmd.com/sex-relationships/signs-catfishing (explaning that a catfish usually
develops social media accounts to make their persona seem more believable) See MCAFEE,
supra note 42 (stating the ease of hacking a social media profile).
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hacking or catfishing occurrence to be “some elaborate and ongoing
conspiracy.”192 This statement not only misclassifies how hackers and catfishers
work, but is insulting to the intelligence of the almost 18,000 United States
citizens that find themselves victims of catfishers each year. 193
To fix this problem, Texas should adopt the Maryland standard, inclusive of
the changes recommended below. This would include adopting the threeauthentication methods Maryland sets out specifically. More importantly,
however, Texas needs to transform its current view of social media as it
understand the legitimate dangers of social media.
B. Maryland Needs to Allow Less Self-Authenticated Evidence
It is likely obvious that the Maryland system is flawed. Although those flaws
are not as dangerous as violating a defendant’s constitutional rights, changes are
needed to create a more perfect system. In all jurisdictions, Facebook records
received directly from the company as business records are self-authenticating
and no testimony to their authenticity is needed.194 This has been interpreted to
fit into the third authentication method in Maryland, where information obtained
directly from the social media site is properly authenticated.195 However, as
discussed previously, the information in these Facebook records is virtually no
different than a simple screenshot, leaving the opponent of the evidence unable
to explain the entire picture before its admission.196 With the evidence already
admitted, the jury’s weight and creditably determination becomes the only
protection against a due process violation.197
By leaving the possibly unauthentic evidence of a social media screen shot up
to a jury determination, Maryland has created a problem they were trying to
avoid––the jury making a prejudiced determination of the evidence.198 This is
the same unnecessarily suggestive problem seen in eye witness testimony that
the Supreme Court deemed unconstitutional.199 To remedy this problem, a
simple change is needed: treating the Facebook business record the same as a
screenshot.200 In using Facebook records as screenshots, the records would fall
Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 645.
Cyber Actors Use Online Dating Sites to Conduct Confidence/Romance Fraud and
Recruit Money Mules, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Aug. 5, 2019),
https://www.ic3.gov/Media/Y2019/PSA190805/.
194 FACEBOOK, supra note 152.
195 Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415, 428 (Md. 2011).
196 See FACEBOOK, supra note 152.
197 See MD. R. EVID. 5-104(b) (“This rule does not limit the right of a party to introduce
before the trier of fact evidence relevant to weight or credibility.”).
198 Sublet v. State, 113 A.3d 695, 709 (Md. 2015).
199 See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967).
200 But see MD. R. EVID. 5-902(b)(1) (“Testimony of authenticity as a condition
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into an illustrations identification category. To authenticate illustrations such as
screenshots, Maryland Rules of Evidence require “[t]estimony of a witness with
knowledge that the offered evidence is what it is claimed to be.” 201 This would
mean that the witness with knowledge of the information obtained by the social
media network would be a person employed by the social media network or the
purported author. This is in line with Griffin’s holding, “in which a printout of
an image from such a site requires a greater degree of authentication than merely
identifying” distinctive characteristics or just entering the records into
evidence.202 This is directly relevant to the purpose of authentication of social
media, which is to protect from “potential [] abuse and manipulation of a social
networking site by someone other than its purported creator and/or user.”203 This
would not require Maryland to change the third authentication method, but rather
would require it to revert back to the original Griffin interpretation.204
As mentioned above, the third method of authentication is rooted in the New
York’s Clevenstine opinion.205 If the Maryland courts were truly trying to
follow the Clevenstine precedent, courts would not allow evidence obtained
directly from the social media network, such as Facebook records, to be selfauthenticating. The whole purpose of the Court’s holding in Clevenstine is for
the employee of the social media network to be able to give “ample
authentication for admission of [] evidence.”206 Thus, in order for a jury to hear
the defendant’s whole story regarding the proffered social media evidence,
testimony must be heard regarding the authenticity of the evidence. 207 Selfauthenticating social media evidence is beyond the scope of the Clevenstine
holding and is likely not considered a correct interpretation of Griffin’s third
method of authentication.208 The correct interpretation should be the foregoing
interpretation: a records custodian to testify at the behest of the opponent.
C. Hypothetical: Tuiasosopo v. Texas and Maryland
Taking this process out of the court and reality, and into to a theoretical case
study, a reasonable jury could find many catfish situations are not hoaxes, and
precedent to admissibility is not required as to the original or a duplicate of a record of
regularly conducted business activity”).
201 Id. 5-901(b)(1).
202 Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415, 424 (Md. 2011).
203 Id.
204 See id. at 428.
205 Id. (“This method was apparently successfully employed to authenticate a MySpace
site in People v. Clevenstine.”).
206 People v. Clevenstine, 891 N.Y.S.2d 511, 514 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009).
207 See Griffin, 19 A.3d at 428; Clevenstine, 891 N.Y.S.2d at 514.
208 See Griffin, 19 A.3d at 428; Clevenstine, 891 N.Y.S.2d at 514.
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the situation of an online friend or partner is authentic.209 Taking Manti Te’o as
an example—most of America was shocked to find out that Te’o’s dead
girlfriend did not exist.210 But, even those closest to Te’o found it reasonable to
believe “Kekua” was real.211
Eventually Ronaiah Tuiasosopo admitted he tricked Te’o, but only after the
scandal broke and someone admitted to helping Tuiasosopo by pretending to be
a female voice.212 After Tuiasosopo’s name became public, people started
connecting the dots in a similar way to the court’s use of distinctive
characteristics.213 But even before his name was public, people suspected
Tuiasosopo of being behind the Kekua profile, shown by a man tweeting: “my
fam & I have an idea who the guy is behind the [Kekua] profile & [he’s] up there
leading a worship band at his dad’s church! SMFH.”214 First, the pictures on the
Kekua Facebook page came from a woman who was Tuiasosopo’s high school
classmate.215 Next, “Kekua” told Te’o she was in a car accident and within the
same timeline as Tuiasosopo’s car accident.216 Lastly, Tuiasosopo went to a
Notre Dame football game after “Kekua’s death,” at a time in which Manti Te’o
and Norte Dame fans were mourning the death of “Kekua.”217
Removing Tuiasosopo’s admission of the hoax from consideration, if
209 Arguably a juror could be anyone as jurors are citizens. Jury Of One’s Peers, LEGAL
INFO. INST. (July 2020), https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/jury_of_one%27s_peers.
210 Notre Dame Presents Believable Explanation for Manti Te’o Girlfriend Hoax,
YAHOO! (Jan. 16, 2013), https://sports.yahoo.com/news/ncaaf—manti-teo-girlfriend-hoaxnotre-dame-jack-swarbrick-sincere-045713273.html.
211 Alexander Abad-Santos, Why the Manti Te’o Defense Still Doesn’t Add Up,
ATLANTIC (Jan. 17, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/01/whymanti-teo-defense-still-doesnt-add/319345/ (“There was never any indication there was
anything fishy about what they said.”).
212 Alexander Abad-Santos, Ronaiah Tuiasosopo: The Mastermind of the Manti Te’o
Hoax – and Much More, ATLANTIC (Jan. 18, 2013),
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/01/ronaiah-tuisasosopo-manti-teohoax/319304/.
213 See id.
214 Id. One reason it is possible that people recognized Tuiasosopo as the catfisher before
he came forward may be due to his blurred lines between the fake profile and Tuiasosopo’s
reality. This is beyond the scope of this article, but may be relevant in understanding the
mind of a catfisher or hacker. Melissa Hogenboom, The Devious Art of Lying by Telling the
Truth, BBC (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20171114-the-disturbingart-of-lying-by-telling-the-truth. (“Misleading by ‘telling the truth’ is so pervasive in daily
life that a new term has recently been employed by psychologists to describe it: paltering.”).
215 Abad-Santos, supra note 211.
216 Id. This lie by Ronaiah Tuiasosopo has some element of truth, which made it so those
that new Tuiasosopo could connect him to the catfish profile of Kekua. See Hogenboom,
supra note 214 (“Lying can and does clearly serve a devious social purpose. It can help
someone paint a better picture than the truth.”).
217 Manti Te’o Girlfriend Hoax All Scams Lead to Ronaiah Tuiasosopo, TMZ (Jan. 17,
2013), https://www.tmz.com/2013/01/17/manti-teo-ronaiah-tuiasosopo-scandal-hoax-notredame-photo-girlfriend/.
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Tuiasosopo were on trial for criminal allegations, it is more than likely that the
Kekua profile would be admissible in Texas, but not in Maryland. For example,
in Garcia v. State, the Texas Court of Appeals allowed evidence of a fake
Facebook profile to be admitted into evidence when a police officer and others
testified as to the authentication of the social media page.218 Yet, in Griffin v.
State, the Maryland Court of Appeals held the proposed Myspace profile did not
have sufficient distinctive characteristics that could lead to authentication, even
though there was a connection between the proffered owner and the profile’s
birthday and photograph/likeness. 219 Additionally, a police officer authenticated
the profile, but such authentication was deemed an error as a police officer is not
one of the admitting parties that Maryland allows for social media
authentication.220
In a Texas court, the man who tweeted his knowledge of Tuiasosopo as the
catfisher could authenticate the evidence against Tuiasosopo by testifying about
the distinctive characteristics: the use of Tuiasosopo’s high school classmate as
the Kekua profile photo and both Tuiasosopo and Kekua being in a car accident
around similar times.221 In Maryland, however, this evidence would not be
sufficient to support a finding that the profile in question is what it purports to
be, considering that the author of the tweet would not be able to testify to the
authenticity of the catfish profile as the tweet’s author does not fit into any of
Maryland’s authentication methods. Additionally, considering the birthday and
photograph in Griffin were not sufficient to constitute distinctive characteristics,
the distinctive characteristics of the Kekua profile would most likely not be
considered sufficient as well.222
The entrance of sufficient distinctive characteristics is parallel to Rule 104(b);
in both Texas and Maryland, relevance depends on facts, and the sufficient
characteristics are the facts that create the relevance and genuineness. 223 If the
threshold of sufficient characteristics, and how those characteristics are testified

218 Garcia v. State, No. 06-15-00187-CR, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 12117, at *16 (Tex.
App. Nov. 10, 2016).
219 Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415, 424 (Md. 2011); but see Tienda v. State, 358 S.W.3d
633, 647 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (“[T]here are far more circumstantial indicia of
authenticity in this case than in Griffin.”).
220 Griffin, 19 A.3d at 427–28 (listing the three authentication opportunities as the
purported creator, the purported creator’s computer history, or information obtained directly
from the social media site).
221 This entire theoretical case study of Tuiasosopo is ignoring evidence entering into the
record, or not entering into the record, on hearsay reasons. The readings of this section
should focus sole on entering evidence on the basis of authenticity, not on the basis of
hearsay. See Garcia No. 06-15-00187-CR, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 12117, at *13.
222 Griffin, 19 A.3d at 418.
223 FED. R. EVID. 104(b); TEX. R. E VID. 104(b); MD. R. E VID. 5-104(b).
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thereto, are low, then the entire procedure is tainted.
In Texas, the court claims that the sediments of unauthentic evidence, that
enter into the record due to the low sufficient standard for distinctive
characteristics, is filtered by opposing counsel to prove that the fact is untrue,
then by a reasonable jury.224 Yet, in Maryland, the court begins sifting unreliable
evidence procedurally, through the three-authentication methods, then the court
looks at the circumstantial evidence/distinctive characteristics to determine
whether the preponderance of the evidence establishes whether a reasonable jury
could determine the evidence to be authentic.225 At this point, the judge turns
the
determination
of
authenticity
to
the
jury.226
Fortunately for Tuiasosopo, he did not receive criminal charges for deceiving
Te’o, especially considering he admitted to being the man behind the profile. 227
Regardless of the actual criminal nature of the catfishing situation, this analogy
shows the difference between the evidence that could be considered authentic in
each jurisdiction.
V. CONCLUSION
No one should feel comfortable about the ease of hacking, catfishing, and the
general unknowns of social media. Yet, Texas seems to be. Texas is too trusting
of social media, as it allows for anybody to testify to the authenticity of social
media with a low burden of proof regarding the relevancy of the post or
profile.228 Meanwhile, Maryland is outspoken on the dangers of social media
and requires a heightened standard for both witnesses and proof of
authenticity.229
Neither system is perfect—while Maryland may dismiss many pieces of real
social media profiles and postings due to their heightened standard, Texas may
allow in too many unauthentic social media posts and profiles. However, being
too strict and burdensome in the process of criminal procedures may be required
to protect defendants from a potentially oppressive criminal justice system.230
Maryland attempts to protect their citizens from due process violations
through their heightened burdens.231 Texas, however, is playing a dangerous
game with their citizens’ constitutional rights to freedom of life and liberty by
Tienda v. State, 358 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
Griffin, 19 A.3d at 418.
226 Id. at 430.
227 Abad-Santos, supra note 211.
228 See generally Roundy, supra note 60.
229 Angus-Anderson, supra note 59, at 37.
230 Id. at 43.
231 Griffin, 19 A.3d at 424; Parker v. State, 85 A.3d 682, 686 (Del. 2014); see also Sublet
v. State, 113 A.3d 695 (Md. 2015).
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failing to create processes that are fair or that allow for defendants to be
completely heard by the court.232 If unauthentic evidence is admitted and makes
the defendant’s charge more probable, the defendant’s Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights to life and liberty have been violated.233 Thus, the process
that is needed to authenticate social media in the court system must not allow
for unreliable or false social media postings and profiles to be admitted, while
admitting truly authentic evidence. The world, and specifically its courts, has a
lot to learn about the dangers of social media, but Texas can start changing now
by shifting their evidence processes and giving their defendants what is ‘due’––
protection of their freedoms.234

232
233
234

Schreck, supra note 116, at 1124.
See U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, §1.
Id. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, §1; see generally Strauss, surpa note 117.

